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Abstract
Decentralised decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the produc-
tion of public goods is analysed within a general equilibrium model with a
representative agent and no pure proﬁts. It is shown that decentralisation (i)
does not necessarily imply aggregate production eﬃciency and (ii) need not
be optimal even if all public goods are neutral. Also, cost beneﬁt criteria are
derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterised.
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In cost beneﬁt analysis a general rule of thumb for the optimal level of public
goods projects is that the sum over individuals of marginal rates of substitution be-
tween the public project and some arbitrary private numeraire commodity should
equal the marginal cost of the public goods project (
P
MRS = MC). This rule
originates from the Samuelson (1954, 1955) treatment of the Pareto eﬃcient sup-
ply of public goods and is sometimes known as the Samuelson–rule. When the
rule is valid it implies that a trade oﬀ between any two public goods should be
such that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution over consumers between
two public goods should equal the marginal rates of transformation between the
same two public goods. Thus, ﬁrst best implies that the central government could
delegate to a subordinate bureau to decide about public goods following this rule
of thumb subject to a given expenditure limit.
The Samuelson–rule, however, requires access to the type of diﬀerentiated
lump–sum taxes that are required by the second fundamental welfare theorem. It
then follows that in the presence of diﬀerent types of second best tax systems this
rule of thumb is only valid in special cases; as is well known in the theoretical
literature as well as in applied cost beneﬁt analysis.1
The reason for this is that is not only the fact that there is a dead–weight loss
associated with second best tax systems used for marginal ﬁnance of public goods
projects as hypothesised by Pigou (1947, p. 33f). There are in fact generally
three additional eﬀects: (1) Second best taxes are also associated with income
eﬀects which may reinforce or work opposite to the substitution eﬀects. (2) The
public good projects may be complements or substitutes with the private goods
that constitute the tax base so the marginal cost of producing of the public good
may not be equal to the net eﬀect on the public budget. (3) There are general
equilibrium eﬀects on the price structure.
The deviation of the second best cost–beneﬁt criterion from the Samuelson–
rule has created two large research ﬁelds. One is concerned with the question
whether the second best optimal level of the public good is larger or smaller than
the ﬁrst best level (the level issue).2 The other is concerned with under which
circumstances the second best criterion will take the same form as the Samuelson–
rule (the rule or decentralisation issue).3 Although the form of the rule for a
second best optimal supply of public goods may seem to be of academic interest
only, it has an important consequence: If the second best cost–beneﬁt criterion
1See, e.g., Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a,b), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971), Atkinson and Stern
(1974), Christiansen (1981), King (1986), Wilson (1991) and Boadway and Keen (1993).
2See for instance Wilson (1991), Gaube (2000) and Gronberg and Liu (2001).
3See, e.g., Lau et al. (1978), Christiansen (1981), Besley and Jewitt (1991), Boadway and Keen
(1993).
1take the same form as the Samuelson–rule then public investment decisions may
be delegated and still a second best optimum can be achieved.
In this case therefore, public bureaus make the production decision about pub-
lic goods with instructions to maximise the same welfare function as the cen-
tral government subject to the constraint that the cost for producing public goods
should not exceed a given amount of public tax revenues reserved for this pur-
pose. The issue has in particular been analysed by Lau et al. (1978) and Besley
and Jewitt (1991) who provide conditions stating that if a suﬃcient degree of sepa-
rability between public goods and other goods is present, then the Samuelson–rule
will describe a second best optimum and decentralisation is optimal.
In reality, however, actual decision making about public goods is at odds with
the conclusions of the theoretical literature. Typically the decisions to produce
(which is in focus in the paper) and provide public goods projects and services to
households are not coordinated with the decisions regarding the tax system. The
lack of coordination may arise from diﬀerent forms of delegation about decisions
of how much to produce or provide of public goods projects. One weak form
of delegation is when both ﬁnancing decisions (i.e., decisions about the structure
of taxation) and decisions about the public goods mix are made sequentially by
the central government. Another reason for uncoordinated decisions is when de-
cisions about production or provision of public goods are explicitly delegated to
government agencies that have no role in determining the overall design of the
tax system. A third variant is when decisions about public goods are delegated
to local authorities, which may or may not have the possibility to make ﬁnancing
decisions of their own in addition to the ﬁnancing decisions made by the central
government. For all these variants of delegation, the decision to delegate may
include either public provision or public production or both.4
The present paper takes decentralisation of public goods production decision
as given. Decentralisation or delegation is interpreted in the weak form of un-
coordinated decisions about the structure of taxation and how much and how to
produce diﬀerent public goods or as an explicit delegation to a central government
bureau with no agency problem vis-` a-vi the bureau. Through its internal auditing
service the central government is assumed to have full information about the cost
4Two recent examples where rather strong forms of delegation of public goods are the follow-
ing: Boadway et al. (1999) is rather closely related to the present study but within a framework
with some very speciﬁc assumptions (quasi–linear utility, diﬀerent agencies serving diﬀerent parts
of the population and a principal–agent relationship between the central government and the agen-
cies). In particular, the agencies seem to work as local communities. They do not address the
question of production eﬃciency or if decentralisation is optimal. Focus is on the characterisation
of the marginal cost of public funds. Besley and Coate (2003) considers the eﬀect that central-
isation and decentralisation of local public goods may have on the level goods provided under
diﬀerent political equilibria in a federal–like structure.
2structure of its agencies. In a sense, therefore, the agencies are part of the central
government, but decisions regarding the design of the tax system and the struc-
ture of public goods investments are uncoordinated. The central government then
acts as a Stackelberg leader taking into account that its decisions will aﬀect the
behaviour of the subordinate bureau. The public bureau is assumed to have the
same objective function as the central government. Throughout, taxes, as well as
other policy instruments, are assumed to be chosen on an optimal level.
The model used is a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and
no pure proﬁts. It is essentially the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) model but with
public production of public goods with private goods as inputs rather than public
production of private goods. Therefore, the analysis in the paper is about public
production rather than public provision.
This will allow us to not only address the question if optimality of decentrali-
sation still holds under the same restrictions on preferences in general equilibrium
(as claimed by Besley and Jewitt (1991)), but also to consider the issue of aggre-
gate production eﬃciency under decentralisation. As the model is speciﬁed cen-
tral decision making will imply aggregate production eﬃciency. The more general
question when decentralised supply of public goods is optimal is not addressed.
We will also ask the following questions: (1) What will the cost–beneﬁt rule look
like under decentralisation compared to a centralised second best optimum? (2)
What is the characterisation of the cost of public funds under decentralisation?
The paper establishes two main results. First, decentralisation implies aggre-
gate production ineﬃciency. The main implication of this result is that, given
decentralisation, to achieve a constrained Pareto eﬃcient solution the government
should not let private ﬁrms, or publicly owned ﬁrms working under the same con-
ditions as private ﬁrms, produce the public goods. Instead the optimum will be
inconsistent with private cost minimisation. Second, decentralisation is not opti-
mal even if all public goods are neutral vis-` a-vi all private goods. It is not optimal
becauseunderthisassumptionthegovernmentcouldnotdecentralisepublicgoods
production and achieve the same solution as in the centralised second best case.
This means that focus for future research should shift to the question why decen-
tralised (or rather uncoordinated) decision making regarding public goods and the
tax system occur at all. One way to answer this question would be to ﬁnd new
criteria under which decentralisation (or uncoordinated decisions) is optimal.
For both these results there is the same economic mechanism explaining them.
Under centralised decision making changes in government control variables will
cause equilibrium producer prices to change. The result is a change in tax rev-
enues from commodity taxation (called tax rate eﬀect in the paper) and a change
in the cost of production of public goods (called an expenditure eﬀect in the pa-
per). These eﬀects on the government’s budget can then in the centralised regime
be shown to equal the change in pure proﬁts in the private sector. However, since
3pure proﬁts are zero in a long run equilibrium the eﬀect on the government’s
budget due to changes in equilibrium prices sum up to zero. This is one way of
looking at the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) production eﬃciency result; there
is no mechanism under constant returns to scale and centralised and coordinated
decision making in the public sector through which changes in government con-
trol variables may aﬀect social welfare via equilibrium price changes. Under de-
centralised decision making, however, the central budget is split up so that cen-
tral government decides about taxes and aggregate expenditure on public goods
whereas the bureau decides about the allocation of public goods given the struc-
ture of taxation and aggregate expenditure decided by the central government.
Even if the change in pure proﬁts is still zero, the tax rate eﬀect will aﬀect the
central government and the expenditure eﬀect will aﬀect the bureau.
The paper is organised so that the most simple version of the model is dis-
cussed in section 2 and section 3. In section 2 household behaviour is described
and in section 3 the centralised second best optimum. In section 4 the decen-
tralised second best optimum, i.e., when decentralisation is a constraint, is anal-
ysed. Section 5 contains conclusions.
2 Model
The model used is in principal the representative individual version of Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971a), but where the public sector produces diﬀerent public goods
instead of diﬀerent private goods. As in the Diamond–Mirrlees case the govern-
ment is restricted not to use lump sum taxation although the population is homo-
geneous. These assumptions then implies that all goods are taxable, that a pure
proﬁts tax is unnecessary under centralised decision making since proﬁts are zero
due to constant returns to scale and that diﬀerential taxation on inputs in the pri-
vate sector is not used.
The representative individual has preferences, satisfying standard assump-
tions, over an n + 1 dimensional vector of private goods x and an m dimensional
vector of public goods y. These preferences are represented by the real–valued
strictly quasi–concave function u deﬁned by u(x,y) on the nonnegative orthant of
Rn+m+1. Facing the consumer price vector q the solution to the consumer’s utility








The interpretation is then that x denotes the net demand/supply of the represen-
tative individual. Let the indirect utility function be υ(q,y) := u(x∗(q,y),y). We
can then write Roy’s identity as ∂υ
∂qk = −λx∗
k(q,y) ∀k = 0,...,n, where λ is the
4marginal utility of income in the optimal point. It follows from the Envelope the-
orem that ∂υ/∂y` = ∂u/∂yi ∀i = 1,...,m, where yi is the level of the public goods
project.
Private goods are produced by private ﬁrms on perfectly competitive markets
with the use of a constant returns to scale production technology represented by
the private sector transformation function F (z) = 0, where z is the (n + 1) dimen-
sional netput vector. Since ﬁrm size under constant returns to scale is indetermi-
nate we normalise the number of ﬁrms to unity and talk about a representative
ﬁrm. Facing the producer prices p the ﬁrm chooses its netput z so as to maximise
its proﬁts p0z subject to the production constraint. Because of constant returns to
scale pure proﬁts will be zero in equilibrium. As a consequence, see, e.g., Munk
(1978), one consumer price and at least on producer price must be normalised.
Therefore, let the consumer and producer prices on commodity 0 be normalised
so that q0 = p0 = 1. Note that this normalisation implies that the marginal utility
of income equals the marginal utility of the numeraire commodity (commodity 0).





= pi ∀i = 1,...,n (2)
These ﬁrst order conditions together with the zero proﬁt condition p0z = 0 (i.e.,
a requirement that we are in a long run equilibrium) then determine the optimum
netput vector z∗(p).
Public goods are produced in the public sector with use of a production tech-
nology represented by the transformation function
G(y,−w) = 0. (3)
where w is an n+1 dimensional vector representing the public demand of private
goods used to produce public goods. Of particular interest is which marginal
increase in factor j that is required for a marginal increase in the production of
project i (i.e., the inverse of the marginal product of factor j in the production of









We can then deﬁne the private marginal cost of producing public good i using
an arbitrary factor j, i.e., the marginal cost that a private ﬁrm using the same




∀i = 1,...,m and j = 1,...,n. (5)
5Prices p on private goods are determined by the market clearing condition
x
∗(q,y) + w = z
∗(p), (6)
where consumer prices q will be treated as control variables of the government
together with public goods supply y and public demand of private goods w. These
control variables will accordingly aﬀect the equilibrium producer prices, which
therefore are written as p(q,y,w), with p0 = 1. Multiplying the equilibrium
condition (6) with producer prices p(q,y,w) we get p(q,y,w)
0 (x∗ (q,y) + w) =
p(q,y,w)
0 z∗ (p(q,y,w)), where the left hand side by deﬁnition is the proﬁt func-
tion. As a digression note that diﬀerentiation of the zero proﬁt condition,
π(p(q,y,w)) = p(q,y,w)
0 z
∗ (p(q,y,w)) = 0 (7)
with respect to a government control variable ξ ∈ {q,y,w}, with employment of
Hotelling’s lemma, i.e., ∂π
∂pi = z∗
i ∀i = 0,...,n, the market clearing condition (6)
and that
∂p0




























Continuing, since pure proﬁts as well as the market value of consumer net de-
mand, the latter valued at consumer prices, both are zero, i.e., π(p(q,y,w)) =
q0x∗ (q,y) = 0, we have p(q,y,w)
0 (x∗ (q,y) + w) = q0x∗ (q,y) or
(q − p(q,y,w))
0 x
∗ (q,y) = p(q,y,w)
0 w, (9)
which is the government’s aggregate budget constraint.5 Note that the diﬀerence
q − p(q,y,w) is interpreted as the speciﬁc commodity taxes used to ﬁnance the
public sector; i.e., t = q − p(q,y,w) ∈ Rn+1 with t0 = 0 due to the normalisation
of prices.
The aggregate budget constraint is however inappropriate for an analysis of
decentralised production decisions. Therefore, let E denote aggregate govern-




∗ (q,y) = E, (10)
and the budget constraint of the bureau deciding about public production
E = p(q,y,w)
0 w. (11)
5Notice that this implies that there no pure proﬁts in the public sector. This follows from the
assumption that public goods are ﬁnanced through taxation and not through user charges.
63 Centralised investment decisions
The standard assumption in the literature is that public decision making is cen-
tralised and coordinated in the sense that decisions about the structure of taxation
and the structure of expenditure are made simultaneously by the central govern-
ment. In this section some of the results from the literature are recapitulated but
in a form, that is we use the budget constraints (10) and (11) rather that (9), that
facilitates comparison with the results for decentralised decisions presented in the
subsequent sections.
When the central government controls all taxes as well as the expenditure
levels on the individual projects it solves
max
q,E,y,w
υ(q,y) s.t. (3), (10) and (11). (12)

































where, for notational simplicity, the notation for the optimal tax is used instead
of the diﬀerence between consumer and producer prices evaluated in the optimal
point. Using
∂p0
























































































































∀j = 1,...,n, k = 0,...,n, ` = 1,...,m and r = 1,2,3. The Lagrange–multiplier
µc
1 is the marginal social welfare of increased tax revenue, the multiplier µc
2 the
7marginal social welfare of increased public expenditure and the multiplier µc
3 is
the marginal social welfare of relaxing the production constraint.
Studying the ﬁrst order conditions we notice three diﬀerent eﬀects through
which government control variables indirectly aﬀect the problem since consumer
net demand and equilibrium producer prices are aﬀected by these instruments; in
the case of public inputs only equilibrium prices are aﬀected: (i) tax base eﬀect,
(ii) tax rate eﬀect since the tax rate is aﬀected via changes in equilibrium producer
prices and (iii) expenditure eﬀect since expenditure on public inputs via changes
in equilibrium producer prices. Eﬀects (ii) and (iii) sum up to the change in pure
proﬁts according to (8) and the change in pure proﬁts is zero due to constant
returns to scale so their combined eﬀect via the public budget is zero. Remains
the tax base eﬀect which allows the choice of consumer prices and the level of
public goods to aﬀect aggregate tax revenues.
The ﬁrst order conditions (14a)–(14d) can now be used to describe the optimal
point along diﬀerent trade oﬀs. First we have the trade–oﬀ between gross public
expenditure and public tax revenues deﬁned as δ :=
µ2
µ1. From the ﬁrst order
condition (14a) we have
δ
c = 1 (15)
implying that in the optimal point the trade oﬀ between gross expenditure and tax
revenues is one–to–one. That is, a marginal increase in public expenditure will re-
quire an equal marginal increase public revenues because the government assigns
the same value to marginal tax revenues as to marginal aggregate expenditure.
Second, there is the trade oﬀ between public tax revenues and individual in-
come. It is described by the concept marginal cost of public funds deﬁned as
γ :=
µ1














, ∀j = 1,...,n (16)
The marginal cost of public funds described by (16) is the same for all commod-
ity taxes in the optimal point. The enumerator is the individual’s cost and the
denominator the government’s gain of an increase in the tax on commodity k; the
6This deﬁnition is by no means self–evident. I here follow Sandmo (1998) who advocates
a deﬁnition of the marginal cost of public funds which is independent of the particular project
studied. An alternative would be to deﬁne project speciﬁc marginal cost of public funds. Much
of the early literature on the marginal cost of public funds was obscured because the deﬁnitions
used where project speciﬁc (public goods projects or lump sum transfer projects); see Ballard
and Fullerton (1992) for a discussion. This is reﬂected in the empirical/simulation literature where
estimates of the marginal cost of public funds are project speciﬁc; see for instance Hansson (1984).
8latter deviates from the former because the tax also have indirect consequences on
the tax base (i.e., the ﬁscal externality). These indirect consequences are due to
changes in individual behaviour caused by the tax change on commodity k. The
utility consequences to the individual of these behavioural changes are of course
zero according to the envelope theorem.
The third trade oﬀ is between the diﬀerent private goods used as inputs in the









∀j = 0,...,n. (17)
From (17) it follows that any marginal technical rate of substitution, between any
two factors, say a factor j = 1,...,n and factor 0 (the numeraire), in public goods










∀j = 1,...,n, (18)
where the last equality follows from the ﬁrst order condition of private ﬁrms (2).
This is the classic Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) production eﬃciency result; the
public sector should use factors of production so that its marginal rates of transfor-
mation equal the marginal rates of transformation for private ﬁrms using the same
factors of production.7 The public sector as a producer of public goods should
therefore replicate the cost minimising behaviour of the private ﬁrm if it were
producing the public goods and was reimbursed (under the assumption that there
is no agency problem) by the government for its production cost. The marginal
cost for increasing the production of a public good should therefore be same same
independent of which factor of production that is used to expand production, or
else a reallocation of factors would reduce the cost for a given level of public
project output. Accordingly, using (4), (5), and (17) and letting Cj denote the uni-
form social marginal cost and cj the uniform private marginal cost of producing














∀i = 0,...,m and j = 0,...,n. (19)
The fourth trade oﬀ is between consumption of a public good and private con-
sumption described by the individuals private marginal beneﬁt of a project (the
7Private goods are inputs or outputs in the private sector but only inputs in the public sector.
The right–hand side of (18) can therefore be either a marginal rate of transformation, a marginal
rate of technical substitution or a marginal product but the left–hand side is a marginal rate of
technical substitution. To keep terminology simple only the term marginal rate of transformation
is used however.
9individual marginal willingness to pay for the project) deﬁned as bj :=
∂υ/∂yj
λ
∀j = 1,...,m. The ﬁrst order conditions (14a) can then, using equations (4), (15),



















      ∀j = 1,...,m. (20)
In the cost–beneﬁt criterion (20) we interpret the left–hand side as the social
marginal beneﬁt and the right–hand side is the social marginal cost, but where
these are deﬁned so that social and private marginal beneﬁts coincide. We there-
fore focus on the social marginal cost which has two components. The bracketed
term is the net eﬀect on the public budget of spending one additional unit of tax
revenue on project j, given that the tax system is unchanged; i.e., the optimal
shadow price for the public good. This net eﬀect is the direct marginal cost of
the project minus the indirect eﬀect on tax revenues due to the ﬁscal externality
caused by the distortionary tax system. However, taxes are not unchanged because
the additional expenditure has to be ﬁnanced. But ﬁnancing is in itself subject to
the ﬁscal externality. Every net unit spent on the project therefore must be mul-
tiplied with the marginal cost of public funds in order to get the social marginal
cost.
Both the tax used for ﬁnancing and the project size itself may increase or
decrease the tax base and therefore we generally do not know whether the social
marginal cost is higher or lower than the private marginal cost. Hence, if both
the project itself and the tax used on the margin to ﬁnance it increase the tax
base, then the social marginal beneﬁt is less than the private marginal cost even if
the tax system is distortionary. Available simulations suggest that the combined
eﬀect the marginal cost of public funds and the shadow price of the public good
under distortionary marginal ﬁnancing may be in a range from about 0.8 and up
wards far beyond unity depending on the type project and the marginal source of
ﬁnancing.8
The marginal cost of public funds has been emphasised as a tool in practical
cost beneﬁt analysis. This role should not be over–emphasised, however. The
concept is important when one analyse the overall size of the government, either
from the revenue side or from the expenditure side. To see that the marginal
cost of public funds is not important for the composition of expenditure note that
the cost–beneﬁt criterion (20) describes the trade–oﬀ between consumption of a
public good and private consumption. If we instead consider the, ﬁfth and ﬁnal,
trade–oﬀ between two public goods projects α and β we form the marginal rate of
8The literature is extensive. As an example see Hansson (1984).
























∀α,β = 1,...,m, α , β, (21)
which is independent of the marginal cost of public funds. Instead, the trade–
oﬀ between the two projects, given the overall size of the public sector, is op-
timal when the marginal rate of substitution equals the social marginal rate of
transformation (i.e., the ratio between the optimal shadow prices). Equation (21)
therefore illustrates the fact that generally in second best economies the private
marginal rate of substitution between two public projects does not equal the pri-
vatemarginalrateoftransformationduetopotentialdiﬀerencesinthenon–neutra-
lity vis-` a-vi the tax base of diﬀerent public goods projects. The reason the mar-
ginal cost of public funds does not enter into (21) is that this equation is derived
under the assumption that the project mix is determined for a given public bud-
get, whereas the marginal cost of public funds occurs in (20) where the policy
policy maker by choosing the level of all individual projects is at the same time
determining the overall size of the public budget.
4 Delegated investment decisions
A problem with the cost–beneﬁt rule (20) is that a marginal variation in the project
size requires a corresponding variation in some tax parameter under a balanced
budget constraint. Hence, it requires coordinated decisions regarding project sizes
and the design of the tax structure.9 The main problem of this paper is to analyse
how the cost beneﬁt rule will change if the central government provides a given
budget for public projects to a public bureau and also delegates to this bureau to
decide how this amount should be divided on the diﬀerent projects. Hence, the
overall size of the government is decided directly by the central government but
the project mix is determined by the bureau.
The public decision procedure is then assumed to be made in two steps (start-
ing backwards):




υ(q,y) s.t. (11) and (3). (22)
9Compare for instance with Boadway and Keen (1993) who analyse the cost–beneﬁt criterion
under an optimal non–linear income tax. They concluded that coordination between tax and ex-
penditure decisions was required, and that therefore the cost–beneﬁt criterion they derived could
not be employed in practical cost–beneﬁt analysis where expenditure decisions are delegated.
11The solution to this problem is a vector of expenditure levels on the diﬀerent
projects and a vector public sector factor demands, which both depend on
consumer prices, individual lump sum income and the aggregate expendi-
ture level; i.e., yd(q,E) and wd(q,E).
Step 1: The central government takes the actions of the bureau, i.e., yd(q,E) and

















We solve to the two–step problem backwards. The step 2 Lagrangian function
for the decision of the bureau is
M
d






















































∂µ` = 0 ∀` = 2,3, where the super index d on the endogenous variables
indicates evaluation in the optimal point.
Before we analyse the bureau’s decision we consider the central government’s
problem. It turns out that we can simplify it by constructing the value function to
the bureau’s problem;
ˆ υ(q,E) := υ(q,y
d(q,E)). (27)



















where the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian function are evaluated in the opti-
mal point.
The decentralised structure diﬀers from the centralised in several respects.
Most importantly the control variables of the bureau will depend on the control
variables of the central government. Central government control variables will
therefore have one additional link to aﬀect consumer choices and equilibrium pro-
ducer prices. To keep the notation as simple as possible we therefore introduce the
12total derivatives of the producer price pi ∀i = 1,...,n with respect to the control









































∀k = 1,...,n. (29b)






























The step 1 Lagrangian function for the decision of the central government is
M
d





























































































       = 0,
(32b)






Delegated decisions means that additional channels are created by which the
choice of consumer prices and aggregate expenditure, i.e., the control variables
of the central government, can aﬀect the tax base (i.e., the tax rate and the ex-
penditure eﬀects). More important, however, is that the central government, due
to the decentralisation of public goods production, will only consider eﬀects the
tax base eﬀect and the tax rate eﬀect and whereas the expenditure eﬀect is only
considered by the bureau. The tax rate and the expenditure eﬀects still sum up to
zero according to (30), but there is no decision maker that takes both into account.
Hence, changes in equilibrium producer prices will aﬀect the results even if pure
proﬁts are zero.
13Consider now the same four trade–oﬀs as in the centralised case, where we
start with the control variables of the central government (aggregate expenditure
and consumer prices). Starting with the trade of between aggregate tax revenues
and public expenditure as measured by δd, we get from (31) that
δ























and therefore generally will not be equal to unity. The reason is that in the general
case the public goods are non–neutral so aggregate expenditure, via the public
goods levels, now create a tax base eﬀect and a tax rate eﬀect. Even if all public
goods are neutral vis-` a-vi all private goods there would be a tax rate eﬀect. This
because aggregate expenditure will potentially aﬀect the input as well as output
mix in the production of public goods even if private consumption is unaﬀected
by public goods. The bureau will not take any of this into account since it will
consider itself with the expenditure eﬀect only. As a consequence the central
government and the bureau will assign diﬀerent values to a marginal increase in
aggregate expenditure.
The second trade oﬀ is between public tax revenues and private income as
































, ∀k = 1,...,n (34)
The marginal cost of public funds also contains these two additional eﬀects. First,
a change in consumer prices now creates a tax base eﬀect via a change in the
bureau’s choice of public goods mix. Second, a change in consumer prices creates
a tax rate eﬀect due to changes in equilibrium producer prices. Generally we
cannot say whether in which direction these two additional eﬀects will cause the
marginal cost of public funds
Turning to the control instruments of the bureau, the third trade oﬀ is between
the diﬀerent inputs in public goods production. We can then state the ﬁrst major
result of this paper:
Proposition 1. If public investment decisions are decentralised, with constant
returns to scale in private production and an homogeneous population, then agg-
regate production eﬃciency does not hold, i.e., marginal rates of transformation
betweenanytwofactorsofproductionshouldnotbethesameinpublicandprivate
production.
14Proof. Consider two factors of production, such as factor j and 0. From the ﬁrst

























∀j = 1,...,n, (35)
where the last equality follows from the private ﬁrst order condition (2). 
The reason the eﬃciency theorem does not hold under decentralised decision
making is that, in the trade oﬀ between two diﬀerent inputs, the bureau will take
into account only the expenditure eﬀect but not the tax rate eﬀect. Delegation
creates new incentives for the bureau, which explains the result. Constant returns
to scale is no longer a suﬃcient condition for aggregate production eﬃciency. One
may also note that the proposition holds independent of whether public goods are
non–neutral or not.
Does the result in Proposition 1 has any practical relevance? Whenever the
project is such that at least one producer price is aﬀected, then the theorem will
hold. Only when the project is so limited and small that no producer price is
aﬀected can the problem be regarded as if supply is perfectly elastic and therefore
all producer prices will be unaﬀected by the project.
As a consequence the marginal cost to the bureau of increasing the level of
a public goods project will no longer be equal to the private marginal but to the
























∀j = 1,...,m and k = 0,...,n. (36)
The bureau will therefore not behave as a cost minimising ﬁrm. Also, equalisa-
tion of the private marginal cost of production over factors of production will not
longer be the case. The bureau will instead equalise the social marginal cost of
production Cj as given by (36). Therefore, whenever equilibrium price eﬀects are
non–negligible, then Proposition 1 has something to say about how production
should be organised in the public sector; i.e., it will increase the weight to public
production.



















     . (37)
15The cost–beneﬁt criterion (37) resembles the cost beneﬁt criterion under cen-
tralised decision making (20). However, the marginal cost is no longer the private
marginal cost and the addition term is not how public goods aﬀect the tax base
but how public goods aﬀect the cost of production via changes in equilibrium pro-
ducer prices. As before, however, is the trade oﬀ between public goods aﬀected






















∀α,β = 1,...,m, α , β, (38)
Condition (38) tells us about the optimal trade oﬀ for the bureau between two
public goods. It should be compared with (21). From the previous literature on de-
centralisation of public goods supply we know that the decentralised solution will
coincide with the centralised solution, i.e., decentralisation is optimal, if prefer-
ences satisfy the suﬃcient conditions provided by e.g., Lau et al. (1978, theorems
1 and 2) and Besley and Jewitt (1991, theorems 1 and 2).10 However, these suﬃ-
cient conditions are derived in an economy with ﬁxed producer prices. Although
Besley and Jewitt (1991, p. 1770) claims that none of their results depend on that
assumption they do not show that this is actually the case. Lau et al. (1978, foot-
note 5) note that ﬁxed producer prices implies zero pure proﬁts which in turn is
the condition for production eﬃciency in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a); which
Lau et al. (1978) interprets as a condition for decentralisation.
The conditions for suﬃciency provided by Lau et al. (1978) and more gener-
ally by Besley and Jewitt (1991) are restrictions on preferences such that a suﬃ-
cient degree of separability between the public goods and other commodities are
achieved. Now make the following assumption:




= 0 ∀i = 0,...,n and j = 1,...,m. (39)
Assumption 1 is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for the criteria pro-
vided by Lau et al. (1978) and Besley and Jewitt (1991).This means that under
this assumption decentralisation is optimal under ﬁxed producer prices. However,
with equilibrium changes in producer prices the following result follows:
10Both Lau et al. (1978) and Besley and Jewitt (1991) provide diﬀerent conditions depending
on whether consumer prices are optimally chosen or not. Besley and Jewitt (1991) also show that
their suﬃcient condition also is a necessary condition.
16Proposition 2. Under constant returns to scale in private production and an ho-
mogeneous population, then all public goods being non–neutral in the sense of
Assumption 1, is not a suﬃcient condition for decentralisation of the supply of
public goods to be optimal.

































∀α,β = 1,...,m, α , β. (40b)
Since producer are aﬀected by the quantity decisions of the bureau, conditions
(40a) and (40b) will not coincide. 
In the present model the public sector tax base will, under Assumption 1, be
independent of the level of public expenditure and the project mix. As a conse-
quence, equilibrium producer prices will be unchanged due to changes in public
goods supply (direct eﬀect), but increased public goods will increase public sec-
tor demand for private goods and change the equilibrium producer prices (indirect
eﬀect). Therefore Assumption 1, or the criteria provided by Lau et al. (1978)
and Besley and Jewitt (1991), will not imply that decentralisation of public goods
supply is optimal in the present model.
However, Besley and Jewitt (1991) explicitly claimed that their result holds
under variable producer prices. Why is it that this turns out not to be the case? In
their model Besley and Jewitt (1991) did not only assumed ﬁxed producer prices
but they also assumed ﬁxed and optimally chosen marginal costs of producing
public goods. Therefore, allowing producer prices to be endogenously determined
in equilibrium would not in their model create an eﬀect like the expenditure eﬀect
as in the model analysed in this paper. The reason is that the marginal cost of
producing public goods would still be ﬁxed. Changes in the equilibrium producer
prices will therefore only aﬀect the incentives of the central government, an eﬀect
which turns out to be zero due to zero pure proﬁts, and not the incentives of the
bureau.
What is the equivalent to the assumption of ﬁxed and optimally chosen mar-
ginal costs of producing public goods in the present model? Since the problem is
variable input prices rather than variable marginal costs the solution seems to lie
in an assumption about ﬁxed but optimally chosen input prices for the bureau. To
replicate the second best optimum under the Besley and Jewitt (1991) separability
17requirement the government sets the internal prices equal to the equilibrium pro-
ducer prices in the second best optimum. In the general case, however, with no
restrictions on preferences, such a solution is not necessarily welfare improving.
It may be an welfare improvement since it allows the policy maker to use more
policy instrument, but since the incentive structure is changed as well a welfare
improvement is not self–evident; some other set of prices may improve welfare.
More important is, however, if it is reasonable to assume that the policy maker
can choose input prices for the bureau in such a manner? First, it would imply
that the government could use two price structures; an internal price structure,
which is chosen by the central government, for determining the mix of factors and
public goods and an external price structure (i.e., market producer prices) to de-
termine the actual government expenditure on public goods production. Second,
the central government could furthermore make this choice of input prices coordi-
nated with its choice of tax system. Nonetheless, the perspective employed in this
paper is that the central government at the same time is restricted to coordinate
the productions (i.e., quantity) decisions concerning public goods with the choice
of the tax system. A natural question is that if internal prices for public goods
production can be coordinated with the tax system why cannot quantity decisions
be coordinated in the same way? If we relax the assumption of decentralisation
of public goods production and allow for coordinated quantity decisions, then
the assumption of centrally chosen internal prices seems to be much more reason-
able. However, if the government can make centralised decisions regarding public
goods production and coordinate these decisions with decisions regarding the tax
system it does not need the to use internal prices as an additional instrument.
5 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the consequences for optimal poli-
cies of decentralising public goods supply. The analysis has been performed
within the same model as Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a), i.e., a representative
agent and a constant returns to scale private production technology, with the al-
teration that the public sector produces public goods with private goods as inputs
rather than produces private goods in addition to what is produced by the private
sector. The two key features of the model are pure proﬁts, which are zero in a long
run equilibrium, and decentralisation of the supply of public goods to a subordi-
nate public bureau with a given amount of tax revenues to spend on the production
of public goods.
The main results of the paper are that (i) decentralisation implies that pro-
duction of public goods should use private goods in proportion such that their
marginal rate of transformation does not equal that in private production, i.e., ag-
18gregate production ineﬃciency, and (ii) not even the rather strong requirement that
all public goods are neutral visa vi all private goods implies that decentralisation
is optimal.
One main question not analysed in this paper is under which conditions decen-
tralisation actually is optimal. The present analysis suggests that the conditions
putting restrictions on preferences must be complemented with restriction on the
cost function used by the subordinate bureau or production technology for pro-
ducing public goods.
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